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Arising from a flurry of Supreme Court activism since
1987,' the shape and direction of a new Takings Clause
jurisprudence are now emerging. Of the seven principal
clusters of takings doctrine: perhaps the most vitally affected
area of contention between the state and the individual
property owner is the area of predatory municipal zoning
practice^.^ This is the area of ultimate municipal
1. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); Yee v.
City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1531-34 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 US. 304 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
2. For a discussion of the seven principal clusters of takings doctrine, see
infr& part II.B.l-7. See infra notes 106-110 and accompanying text for a
reconfiguration of these clusters of doctrine in accord with the lengthy dicta in
Lucas. See also infra Configuration A.
3. The conduct of municipal government, and other agencies of the state, can
frequently result in the destruction of private property values as part of a
deliberate plan to acquire property rights for a public purpose. A variety of
governmental tools is frequently used in an attempt to "rig" the market in favor of
government's enrichment of the public accounts at the expense of private property
owners. See San Antonio River Auth. v. Garrett Bros., 528 S.W.2d 266, 274 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1975); see also Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 716 F.2d 1194, 1197-1200
(8th Cir. 1983) (city a ~ e x e dland already zoned for industrial park purposes-and
scheduled for private development-and then proceeded to change the property's
preferred use designation at least four times in a four-year period); Archer
Gardens, Ltd. v. Brooklyn Ctr. Dev. Corp., 468 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(holding that a 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 claim survives a motion to dismiss when both the
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gamesmanship. A governmental unit may employ valuesuppressing or value-diminishing regulatory actions in order to
obtain an outright transfer of the fee title to land, or lesser
property rights, from the private sector at little or no public
costO4 Because of severe municipal budgetary restraints,
coupled with heightened demands for increased public services
and public capital amenities, the temptation to engage in
value-destroying gamesmanship confronts municipal offices
around the country5 This municipal gamesmanship is
city and the city's designated redeveloper act in concert to inhibit the private land
owner's ability to lease, sell, or use its land, thereby creating a cash flow shortage
leading to tax delinquencies and ultimately resulting in title forfeiture to the
government at amounts far below the agreed-upon renewal acquisition price of
$775,000).
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979), af'd on other grounds, ,447
U.S. 255 (1980), is one of the most significant takings cases of the past fifteen
years. In Agins, entrenched large parcel owners combined with the city to block
rezoning for middle- and lower-income residences, thereby depressing residential
land values. See id. at 32-35 (Clark, J., dissenting). The Agins court held that a
private landowner's remedy for a temporary regulatory taking does not lie in
inverse condemnation but, rather, in uncompensated mandamus or declaratory
relief. Id. at 32. However, that portion of Agins was explicitly overruled by the
Supreme Court in First English, 482 U.S. at 310-11. See supra note 1 and
accompanying text.
Apart from the predatory zoning cases, some municipal agencies have prevailed
on'the issue of whether inequitable pre-condemnation activities were unreasonable
or intended to freeze or lower private property values and thus effect a taking.
See, e.g., Cambria Spring Co. v. City of Pico Rivera, 217 Cal. Rptr. 772 (Ct. App.
1985); Redevelopment Agency v. Contra Costa Theatre, Inc., 185 Cal. Rptr. 159 (Ct.
App. 1982); Toso v. City of Santa Barbara, 162 Cal. Rptr. 210 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 901 (1980).
4. Amen v. City of Dearborn, 718 F.2d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1101 (1984). One of the crucial tactics frequently used by municipal
agencies in depressing private property values preparatory to a condemnation
involves communications with tenants of the owner of the private buildings,
discouraging them from continuing tenancies and thus depressing the value of the
property. Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966), af'd, 405
F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968); see Richmond Elks Hall Ass'n v. Richmond Dev. Agency,
561 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1977).
It has been argued that governmental rent-seeking behavior should be
discouraged not because it affects private property owners, but because it adversely
affects sound municipal planning, encourages administrative arbitrariness, and
increases the possibility of legal campaign donations and illegal bribes. Stewart E.
Sterk, Nollan, Henry George, and Exactions, 88 COLUM.L. REV. 1731, 1744-45
(1988).
5. See supra note 3. For example, in Seawall Assos. v. City of New York,
542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989), New York City was (and
still is) under enormous political pressure to resolve the problem of housing the
homeless. There is very little doubt that the ordinance in that case, which required
owners of single-room occupancy rental properties to restore and lease such units
a t controlled rents and which prohibited demolition or vacancy thereof, was
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sometimes referred to by economists as government's "rentseeking" behavior: and it is a symptom of a centuries-old
statist syndrome.'
Like many other parts of the Bill of Rights, the Takings
Clause reflects the pre-Revolutionary experiences endured by
the American colonists during the rule of England's imperial
g~vernment.~The Takings Clause has classically been
construed to permit government t o appropriate private property
for a nearly limitless range of public purposes: but such
designed as a method of providing 52,000 housing units for the city's homeless
without incurring public costs. Although the New York court conceded that "no one
disputes the City's power-indeed its duty-to
fashion meaningful solutions to
address homelessness," id. at 1071, the commands of the 1987 takings trilogy
required that the instant property owners not be forced "alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole." Id. at 1065 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960));
see John P. Trevaskis, Measure of Damages for Regulatory Takings, PRoB. & PROP.,
Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 17, 17-18.
6. Sterk, supra note 4, at 1744-45.
7. It was no mere coincidence that Machiavelli warned the'Medici princes in
Renaissance Italy of the danger to governmental power when taking of property
becomes flagrant: "[Blut above all, a Prince must abstain from taking the property
of others for men forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of
patrimony. Then also pretexts for seizing property are never wanting." NICOL~
THE PRINCE90 (Gouss trans., 1952).
MACHIAVEUI,
8. U.S. CONST.amend. V. "Property must become too precarious for Dhe
Genius of a free People which can be taken from them at the Will of others, who
c a ~ o know
t
what Taxes such people can bear . . . ." Missouri v. Jenkins, 495
U.S. 33, 68-69 (1990) ( K e ~ e d y J.,
, concurring in judgment) (quoting the Virginia
Petitions to King and Parliament, December 18, 1764, reprinted in THE STAMPACT
CRISIS 41 (Edmund S. Morgan ed. 1952)); see Pauline Maier, Popular Uprisings
and Civil Authority in Eighteenthcentury America, 27 WM. & MARYQ. 3 (1970).
English legal policy regarding domestic property rights embraced a strong
tradition of compensation for all property taken by the Crown. WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES
74 (Bernard C. Gavit ed., 1941) ("[Tlhe legislature
alone can interpose, and compel the individual to acquiesce. It does this not by
arbitrarily depriving the party of his property, but by giving him a full
i n d e d i c a t i o n and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained."). J.P.W.B.
McAuslan, Compensation and Betterment, in CITIES, LAW, AND SOCIALPOLICY 77,
86 (Charles M. Haar ed., 1984) ("[A] local planning authority may be required to
purchase land rendered incapable of reasonably beneficial use by virtue of the
refusal of planning permission . . . .").
9. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). As Justice Douglas wrote for
the Court in Berman:
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and
order-these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional
application of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet they merely
illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it . . . .
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or
is not desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and
inclusive . . . . The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical,
'
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takings must be accompanied by payment of just compensation
to the private owner.'' During the past few years, a halfdozen important Supreme Court cases (and numerous state
court decisions) have sharply reconfigured Takings Clause
jurisprudence. These cases bear generally on all seven
classifi~ations~~
of takings law and, for the purposes of this
Article, bear importantly upon the core questions involved with
predatory governmental land regulation.12
Part I1 of this Article briefly delineates the emerging
Takings Clause recodiguration and defines the predatory
regulation class of cases. Part I11 demonstrates that the
concept of "Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations"

aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In
the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made
determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not
for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of Columbia
decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautifid as well as sanitary,
there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Id. at 32-33 (citations omitted); see Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,
233-34 (1984). A good historical perspective on the evolution of direct eminent
domain is found in Tony Freyer, Reassessing the Impact of Eminent Domain in
Early American Economic Development, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 1263. Professor Tribe
quite correctly identifies the doctrine of just compensation as being fundamentally
conservative in that the ends (some desired public benefit) can be prevented by
undercutting the means (requiring payment, not expropriation). LAURENCEH.
TRIBE,C O N S T ~ I O NCHOICES
AL
166-67 (1985).
10. Nothing in Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Berman sanctioned
uncompensated takings as a means to achieve government's end. 348 U.S. at 33
("Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it
through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain
is merely the means to the end.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
11. See supra parts II.B.l-7.
12. The warnings of Madison and others are directly on point with predatory
municipal gamesmanship in the destruction of property values.
It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices [as the Takings
Clause] should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But
what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human
nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government
would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered
by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable
the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to
control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary
control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the
necessity of auxiliary precautions.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added).
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("R.I.B.E.") has now become central to predatory regulatory
takings. Part IV offers the principal alternative legal
formulations for "timing" and "value" which are now at the
heart of all R.I.B.E. determinations; and suggests some useful
extensions and modifications to the Supreme Court's "timing"
doctrine.

A. Original Policy Premises
James Madison and his contemporaries, in framing the Bill
of Rights, embraced several Lockean notions. Respecting the
pr~tectionsafforded t o private property, the Framers' fundamental policy premises concerned the following: a person's
inherent right to private property ownership as being prior and
morally superior to the state's;13 the source of private property
as being the product of individual labor and ingenuity;14 and
private property as a fundamental expression of one's freedom
and its protection as one of the principal reasons for individuals to enter into civilization and create governments.15 These
13. The Supream [sic] Power c a ~ o take
t
away from any Man any part of
his Property without his own consent. For the preservation of Property being the end of Government, and that for which Men enter into
Society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the People should
have Property, without which they must be suppos'd to lose that by
entring [sic] into society, which was the end for which they entered
into it, too gross an absurdity for any Man to own.
JOHN
LOCKE,TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
5 138 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960).
14. Id. 55 137-139.
No. 54, at 339 (James Madison) (Clinton
15. Id. 5 138; see THE FEDERALIST
Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing whether slaves ought to be considered "citizens" or
property). In discussing the facts that exist within a society, Madison also stated:
The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property
originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests.
The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From
the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the
possession of different degrees and kinds of property .immediately results . . . .
THE FEDERALIST
No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). A
modern extension of Lockean-Madisonian views is the "new property." In his landmark analysis of 1964, Professor Charles Reich stated:
[Plroperty performs the function of maintaining independence, dignity and
pluralism in society by creating zones within which the majority has to
yield to the owner. Whim, caprice, irrationality and "antisocial" activities
are given the protection of law; the owner may do what all or most of
his neighbors decry. The Bill of Rights also serves this function, but while
the Bill of Rights comes into play only at extraordinary moments of con-
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policy values informed the Madisonian constitutional formulae,16 that sought a t nearly every turn to curb the potential
for government using its police powers to abuse the personal
and property rights of citizens, of an exploitative predilection
that Madison's revolutionary colleague Thomas Jefferson condemned as the "tendency of all human governments."'' Thus,
the Fifth Amendment was enacted in recognition that
government's inevitable appetites provide a continual danger to
private ownership against which the Constitution must provide
bulwarks.l8 The chief bulwark-and in modem jurisprudence
very nearly the only bulwark-is the right of the citizen whose
property rights are taken to demand payment of just compensation from government.lg

B. Modern Takings Clause Principles
The judicial content given to the Takings Clause in modem
times begins with certain Holmesean notions about the legitimate reach of government's police powers to enact regulations
affecting property without continually paying just compensation (what Holmes referred to as "the petty larceny of the police
power").20 This is coupled with the notion that government

flict or crisis, property affords day-to-day protection in the ordinary affairs
of life. Indeed, in the final analysis the Bill of Rights depends upon the
existence of private property. Political rights presuppose that individuals
and private groups have the will and the means to a d independently.
But so long as individuals are motivated largely by self-interest, their
well-being must first be independent. Civil liberties must have a basis in
property, or bills of rights will not preserve them.
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALEL.J. 733, 771 (1964) (emphasis added).
.
V.
16. U.S. C o ~ s r amend.
17. In a letter from Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval in 1816, the former president wrote:
[Tlhat private fortunes are destroyed by public as well as by private
extravagance. And this is the tendency of all human governments. A
departure from principle in one instance becomes a precedent for a second; that second for a third; and so on, till the bulk of the society is
reduced to be mere automatons of misery, and to have no sensibilities left
but for sinning and suffering.
Reprinted in John G. West, Jr., Monticello's New Democrat, POLV REV., Spring
1993, a t 58.
18. See supra note 12.
19. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
S (Mark D. Howe ed., 1953) (''In this one
20. 1 HOLMES-LASKIL ~ E R 457
[case] my brethren, as usual and as I expected, corrected my taste when I spoke of
relying upon the petty larceny of the police power, dele [sic] 'the petty larceny of.'
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must not "go too far" in r e g ~ l a t i o n . ~Some
~
individuals--certain property owners-must not be singled out to bear
a disproportionate burden of the cost of public benefits which
should be more justly borne by society as a whole through
payment of just c ~ m p e n s a t i o n . ~ ~
A further basic Holmesean precept is that the magnitude
of the public need, the public's urgency to achieve a benefit, is
not material. Regulation cannot be used as a shortcut to paying
for public benefits merely because the public need for such
benefits is great.23
Apart from these rather Olympian generalities, until recent years the judicial development of the Takings Clause has
been
What have eventually evolved are seven classifications or clusters of doctrine, only loosely related to one
another. In order to understand the sudden emergence of
R.I.B.E., timing, and valuation problems as the pivotal questions for legal analysis in the area of predatory municipal practices, it is necessary to take a brief detour through the seven
principal clusters of takings doctrine a s they have evolved to
date.
1. The per se rule

When government uses its coercive force to physically enter or occupy any portion of the property of a private owner,

It is done-our effort is to please.").
21. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 416 (1922).
22. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
23. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416.
24. As Justice Cadena of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals put it:
Despite the fact that the crazyquilt pattern of judicial doctrine in this
area has not yet yielded a principle upon which the cases can be rationalized, it is now universally recognized that acts short of actual physical
invasion, appropriation or occupation can amount to a compensable taking, and that governmental restrictions on the use of property can be so
burdensome as to constitute a compensable taking.
San Antonio River Auth. v. Garrett Bros., 528 S.W.2d 266, 273 (Tex. Civ. App.
FWVATEPROPERTY
AND THE POW1975). See generally RICHARDEPSTEIN,TAKINGS:
ER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN(1985); John J. Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings:
A Decisional Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465 (1983); Frank
Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM.L. REV. 1600 (1988); Joseph L. Sax,Property
Rights in the US. Supreme Court: A Status Report, 7 UCLA J. ENVTL.L. & PoL'Y
139 (1988); Richard G. Wilkins, The Takings Clause: A Modent Plot for a n Old
Constitutional Tale, 64 NOTREDAMEL. REV. 1 (1989). For additional related authorities, see Appendix B. See infra Configuration A for diagram depicting the Takings Clause reconfiguration.
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the per se takings rule requires payment of just compensat i ~ n This
. ~ ~is true regardless of the trivial economic loss suffered by the private owner (or the trivial amount of compensation to be paid by the state for such a taking) or the magnitude
of the state's interest.26At least since 1987 it has also been
clear that both permanent and temporary physical occupations
by the state may constitute per se taking^.^' The per se construct is based upon the late Justice Thurgood Marshall's opinion in Loretto,z8 which has been unfairly derided with considerable sarcasm by some critics as an example of "fetishism" or
"nineteenth century" jurisprudence of a "retrograde" nature.2g
Such criticism misses the mark. Loretto derives its considerable force from the original policy premises of Madison and
other Founders. Justice Marshall's analysis is wholly consistent
with other portions of the Bill of Rights which, directly and
through subsequent judicial interpretation, have vigorously
restrained government &om using its coercive force t o enter the
private property of citizens, whether government's purposes be
t o procure criminal evidence, t o quarter troops, or t o establish a
public benefit by the use of such property.30
2. The harm-prevention rule
For 106 years there has existed in Takings Clause juris-

25. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
26. Id. a t 434-35.
27. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304 (1987). After remand by the Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), the South Carolina court determined that
a variety of damages would be due and payable by reason of periods of temporary
taking due to the regulations struck down by the Supreme Court in Lucas. Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992).
28. 458 U.S. at 419.
29. "Skewed," "retrograde," and "nineteenth century" were the equally colorful
denigrations used by Professor Costonis. Costonis, supra note 24, at 471. Professor
Tribe has characterized Loretto as bordering on "fetishism" and as being an "oddity" and a "lame excuse" for abandoning a workable rule of law. He has also
scorned Loretta for the trivial nature of the amount of property invaded or occupied (1.5 cubic feet) and has advocated an undefined "workable balancing test"
supm note 9, at 177-78.
instead of the per se rule of physical invasion. TRIBE,
Often, property rights protected by the Fifth Amendment are treated casually
by those who would never suggest a cavalier attitude towards other Fifth Amendment protections. This attitude should be contrasted to Professor Reich's view of
property rights. Reich, supra note 15.
30. U.S. CONST.amends. IV & V,see infra part 1V.G.For a discussion of the
underlying Lockean notion that individual rights and liberties are closely tied to
the right of private property ownership, see supra notes 13-15.
'
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prudence a principle that government may aggressively regulate land uses to prevent loss of life or property which are
threatened by the activities on private land by private owne r ~ . ~This
' rule parallels the public nuisance notions at common law.32 Pursuant to this line of precedent, government is
exempt from paying compensation even though it decrees that
illegal breweries must be closed,33 infected cedar trees must
be destroyed,34 urban brickyard plant operations are
banned,s5 gravel and sand mining industries are restrictedP6
underground coal mining activities are limited:'
and the use
of a flood-prone campsite is drastically curtailed.38 Until 1992,
it was widely supposed that this cluster of cases represented
the state's most powerful trump card to significantly regulate
the use of private property without being deemed to have gone
.~~
"too far" and without having to pay just c o m p e n s a t i ~ n Justice Scalia's opinion in Lucas includes several charged passages
of dicta which may or may not result in the future limitation,
or even rejection, of this cluster of cases.40
Subsequent to Lucas, this group of cases probably still
continues to have viability at least with respect to the owner's
illegal activities on private property and to firebreaks and other
emergency hazard^.^' In both instances, and perhaps in others, the government apparently still retains the constitutional

31. See infra notes 33-38; see also Bruce W . Burton, Regulatory Takings and
the Shape of Things to Come: Harbingers of a Takings Clause Reconstellation, 72
OR. L. REV.(forthcoming November 1993).
32. Professor Michelman has opined that regulatory takings have been sorted
into two sub-classes: takings which involve regulations preventing noxious or nuisance-like uses and regulations securing affirmative public benefits. Michelman,
supra note 24, at 1603. Although it is both useful and correct to divide the public
purposes identified by the Court along harm-prevention and benefit-promotion demarcations, this focuses on the governmental ends, not means, and is therefore not
particularly helpful to an analysis of government's predatory practices.
33. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887).
34. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928).
35. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 409-10 (1915).
36. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-96 (1962).
37. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedidis, 480 U.S. 470, 485
(1987).
38. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 258
Cal. Rptr. 893, 905 (Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).
39. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 325-26 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. See Burton, supra note 31.
41. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 n.14, 2900
n.16 (1992).
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authority to act decisively upon private property rights without
paying c ~ m p e n s a t i o n . ~ ~
3. Comprehensive Euclidian zoning
Since the end of the nineteenth century, modem growth
patterns in urban America have given rise to a considerable
body of law favoring government with regard to comprehensive
municipal zoning ordinances affecting land uses.43 For most of
this century, the Supreme Court and lower courts have ruled
that where procedural due process has not been violated and
the land use regulations are not arbitrary or i r r a t i ~ n a l ; ~comprehensive city zoning is a valid exercise of police power and
not one which requires compensation to the private landowne d 5 The general reciprocity of advantage inherent i n classic
Euclidian zoning has been cited as the primary policy ground
unless predatory or other
for not requiring cornpen~ation,4~
abusive elements are p r e ~ e n t . ~ '
4. Aesthetics /historic preservation /evolving cultural

sensibilities
Statism's weakest reed (and the smallest bundle of case
law) flows from the baMing and controversial decision of the
Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York? New York City, for reasons of public aesthetics
and historic preservation, was permitted to regulate land use
in such a way as to deprive the property owner of all use of the
- --

42. Id. For an entertaining polernic whgre "hyper-Lockeann privatists and
other largely unnamed advocates of a foolish "dyadic scheman are contrasted to
enlightened triadic Kantian statists in the Takings Clause struggle between claims
of the private owner and majoritarian appetites, see Daniel W. Bromley, Regulatory
Takings: Coherent Concept or Logical Contradiction?, 17 VT. L. REV. 647 (1993).
43. E.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US. 365, 395-96 (1926);
Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 108 (1909); see also Nectow v. City of Cambridge,
277 US. 183, 188-89 (1928); City of Pharr v. Tippitt, 616 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. 1981).
44. See supra note 43.
45. 6A EUGENEMCQUILLIN,MUNICIPAL
CORPOR~TIONS
8 25.06 (3d ed. 1988).
Although injunctive relief (i.e., no damages) was the thrust of most zoning cases
until the 1987 trilogy, this approach did not go unchallenged. DANIEL R.
MANDELKER,
LAND USE LAW $8 2.17-2.18 (2d ed. 1988). For a cogent account of
this "Nectow fallacy," see Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALEL.J. 385, 490-92 (1977).
46. See MCQUILLIN,supra note 45, 88 24.06-24.07.
47. Burton, supm note 31.
48. 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).

838

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993

valuable air space above Grand Central S t a t i ~ n . ~The
' specific
basis of the Penn Central opinion is unfathomable (there may
be six or seven viable candidates for the exact holding).50Few
cases follow Penn Central, suggesting that this doctrinal classification has suffered a significant dilution from whatever force
it originally p o s s e ~ s e d .In
~ ~any event, Penn Central's minimalist holding would likely be that where government regulations do not deprive the owner of all opportunity to use her
property rights consistent with reasonable investment-backed
expectations ("R.I.B.E.") and where mitigating factors are also
present, regulations premised on historic and aesthetic preservation do not require government to pay just omp pens at ion.^^
5. Exactions /nexus principles

The law of municipal exactions as a facet of takings jurisprudence has evolved rapidly since World War 11." Tradition-

49. Id. at 129.
50. There is strong legal argument for the proposition that Penn Central
could stand for any of the following:
(1) There is a general reciprocity of benefits to the affected property owners
and .to all of society by historic landmark preservation regulations that makes the
losses suffered by specific owners not subject to payment of just compensation
(where, as here, the city denied a building permit for a new, aesthetically disruptive 50-story tower in the air space above Grand Central Station).
(2) The decision as to whether just compensation is necessary must be sufficiently ripe and all possible local remedies exhausted.
(3) The harm-prevention notion of the second cluster of takings decisions (see
supra part II.B.2) may be broad enough to apply to any and all municipal regulations, including aesthetic or historic preservation regulations, regardless of their
impact on private ownership rights.
(4) Great procedural deference must be given to an appellate court's ruling that
the private owners in Penn Central had not met their burden of proof as to the
loss of property value.
(5) No compensation need be paid unless the owner's reasonable investmentbacked expectations have been sacrificed to the government's regulations.
(6) Certain tax advantages and transferable development rights which the government allocated to the affected property owners were the financial equivalent of
compensation and therefore the regulation, even if it effectuated a taking of some
property rights protected by the Fifth Amendment, had also indirectly paid in lieu
of just-compensation benefits.
Id. at 118-19, 134-35; see id. at 120-21, 127, 137; infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text; see also Wilkins, supra note 24.
51. Landmark Land Co. v. City of Denver, 728 P.2d 1281, 1287 (Colo. 1986),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Harsh Inv. Corp. v. City of Denver, 483 U.S. 1001
(1987); see Wilkins, supra note 24, at 22-24.
52. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138.
53. Theodore C. Taub, Exactions, Dedications, and Impact Fees, in ALI-ABA,
LAND USE INSTP~PI'E:
PLANNING, REGULATION,
LITIGATION,
EMINENTDOMAIN,AND

PREDATORY GOVERNMENTAL ZONING
ally, this body of law dealt with the regulatory power of the
government to exact a quid pro quo from a developer-landowner in exchange for certain approvals or permits.54 Classically,
the government has the power, without payment of just compensation, to require that the developer dedicate utility easements, street easements, and similar property rights to the
public in return for receiving authority to subdivide and plat
the land.55 This concept progressively evolved to embrace the
notion that exactions could also include dedication of land for
parks and schools to service the additional population expected
to arise because of the developer's subdivision and home-build.~~
the developer may be required
ing a c t i ~ i t i e s Alternatively,
to pay to the city cash sums in lieu of dedication, to be used for
schools and parks in other areas of the city rather than requiring the dedication of land on site.57 This further evolved into
the principle of "linkage" whereby a developer was required to
contribute additional development deemed necessary in other
parts of the city in exchange for being permitted to develop the
land involved in the permit application. For example, a developer might be required to build low-cost housing in another
part of the city to balance out the entire municipal demographics goal i n return for which the developer would be granted a
building permit for office or retail buildings on the site in questi~n.~~
The case of Nollan u. California Coastal Cornrnis~ion~~
introduced several more rigorous legal standards, some of
which go well beyond exactions law. The Nollan Court rejected
the twin premises that all human property use activities existed at the pleasure of government,BOand therefore any exactions attached by government to permits and licenses were

COMPENSATION
887 (1992).
54. Id.
55. MANDELKER,
supra note 45, § 9.16.
56. Id. $ 9.18.
PLANNING
AND CON57. DANIELR. MANDELKER & ROGERA. CUNNINGHAM,
TROL OF LANDDEVELOPMENT
544, 571-72 (3d ed. 1990); John M. Groen, Developer
CONDEMNATION
AND RELATED
GOVERNFees and Emctions, in ALI-ABA, INVERSE
MENT LLABILITY (1992). See Taub, supra note 53, at 887-88, 909-12 for a general
overview of exactions evolution from on-site land dedication to "linkage fees."
58. See Jerome G. Rose, Development Fees: To What Extent May Municipalities Shift the Costs of Public Improvements to New Developments, N.J. MUNICIPALITIES, Feb. 1988, at 12.
59. 483 U.S.825 (1987). .
60. Id. at 833 n.2.
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d i d o 6 ' This was established at least insofar as classic fee
simple land ownership rights were concerned.62
Nollan introduced the concept that there must be an appropriate connection ("nexus") between the demanded exaction
and the evil which government wishes t o defeat, which evil
must be generated by the landowner's proposed activity.63
Nollan, consistent with the original political values of the Takings Clause, determined that there was considerable risk of
government's "rent-seeking" behavior when exactions were
being demanded of a landowner in return for a permit which
merely allowed the landowner to engage in those activities
historically found within the concept of the fee simple, such as
~ Nollan Court signaled that, 'at
constructing b ~ i l d i n g s .The
least in the area of exactions, a heightened judicial scrutiny
would examine the conduct of govern~nent.~~
Finally, Nollan made it clear that mere news-asserting
verbiage would be insufficient and that the Court would scrutinize very carefully the legislative allegations concerning the
nexus between the landowner's proposed activities and the
required exaction, thereby indicating a modification of the
customary view that all legislative conduct in such matters is
presumed constitutional." Subsequent cases have extended
the logic of the news test into areas not related to exactions
law,67and the growing scope of Nollan has been widely ob-

61. Id.
62. See id. at 831.
63. Id. at 837.
64. Id. at 841-42.
65. In both Nollan and Lucas, the Court made it clear that heightened judicial scrutiny will be applied when property rights are being significantly diminished by regulation or exaction. Evidence of the Court's skepticism about
government's motives is clear. Whether formally or informally, government appears
to be saddled with a larger burden of proof insofar as regulatory takings are concerned. The government bears at least a burden of persuasion with respect to
questions of preexisting law, linkage between the purpose of the regulation and
the evils being regulated, and similar questions. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895; Nollan,
483 U.S. at 841; cf. United States v. Carolene :Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938).
66. 483 U.S. at 838, 841; see Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411
(1915).
67. Seawall Assos. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1068-69 (N.Y.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989).
68. Id.
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6. Categorical formulation
In 1992, Justice Scalia revisited the Takings Clause, writing for a split Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal CounciLBgAs noted earlier, Lucas appears riddled with dicta, but it
may represent the most formidable Takings Clause opinion in
recent times.70Lucas appears to vastly undermine the harmprevention cluster of cases,71 and hints at additional postNollan changes in the presumption of validity granted t o
government's land control legislation." In addition, Lucas
suggests a variety of significant considerations regarding
R.I.B.E.,73 and establishes a new area of seemingly absolute
protection of private property.74 Whenever all valuable use
has been prohibited by a government regulation, the "categorical formulation" requires that just compensation shall be
paid.75 This appears t o be as much a blanket rule as that
found in the physical occupancy cases of Cluster One above.
Unraveling the dicta of Lucas and predicting its future use will
have material implications for all of the other takings clusters .76

7. Predatory municipal zoning practices
As noted, government's aggressive use of its regulatory
power to depress or destroy private values in the interest of
furthering governmental plans for an area has often been regarded as a Takings Clause violation which resurrects some of
the worst Madisonian fears of governmental powers over the
rights of private citizens.77When the municipal council in a
Michigan city freezes the ability of landowners to find tenants
112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
See Burton, supra note 31.
See supra part II.B.2.

112 S. Ct. at 2894, 2898 n.12.
See id. at 2900-01.
Id. at 2902 n.18.

Id. at 2901.
See id. at 2903-04. For example, the implications go not merely t o the
presumption of correctness of legislative determinations and the resulting burden of
proof, but also to such substantial matters as what laws would apply to the determination of R.I.B.E., at what moment in time the R.I.B.E. and the status of such
laws would be fixed for purposes of valuation, and what, if any, absolute defenses
exist on behalf of government to resist the implication that value has been taken.
See id. at 2893, 2894 n.6, 2900 n.16, 2902 n.18.
77. See supra notes I%?.

1
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or purchasers and drives down the value of lands tentatively
scheduled for future redevelopment, it is seen a s a violation of
the protection of private property under the Takings Clause."
Similarly, a regulatory taking may result when two or more
governmental units in Texas, for instance, collaborate to drive
out tenants renting private billboard space preparatory to
government's acquiring the land on which the billboard exi s t ~ ; 'or
~ when a Brooklyn governmental plan creates tax forfeiture foreclosures of private rental property in order to assist
the city's sanctioned renewal developer^;^^ or when an upscale California municipality uses zoning regulations to block
out a low-cost, dense housing development targeted for middleclass and blue-collar residents;" where an Iowa city engages
in mixtures of annexation and repeated rezoning to forestall
the planned development of a n outlying industrial park." All
of these and a host of similar cases typify this final Takings
Clause cluster.83
111. THE R.I.B.E. CONUNDRUM:
AN OVERVIEW
OF THE ISSUES
Market value is driven by land use laws to a very material
extent." When a private person (or even a government entity)
78. Amen v. City of Dearborn, 718 F.2d 789 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465

U.S. 1101 (1984).
79. See Texas v. S.C., a Texas Ltd. Partnership, Case No. 585530, Harris
County Civil Court of Law No. 3. (One of the co-authors is an investor and partner in the defendant).
80. Archer Gardens, Ltd. v. Brooklyn Ctr. Dev. Corp., 468 F. Supp. 609
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
81. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979), affd on other grounds,
447 U.S. 255 (1980), overruled by First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 310-11 (1987).
82. Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 716 F.2d 1194, 1995-96 (8th Cir. 1983).
83. See supra note 3. Configuration A shows the relationship between the
seven Takings Clause clusters.
84. When defining the concept of marketable title for purposes of title insurance, the American Land Title Association ("ALTA") has devised certain formal
exceptions to coverage which, significantly, include all governmental land regulation
laws and other property laws which may have an impact upon the saleability of
the property. See SANDRA H. JOHNSON
ET AL., PROPERTY
LAW 528-34 (1992). It is
an axiom of property valuation techniques that the burden of encumbrances upon a
parcel of land directly diminishes property value. In many litigated zoning battles,
the underlying impetus has historically been the difference in property value between lands subject to a particular use restriction created by governmental ordinance or regulation and lands free of such regulation. See Nedow v. City of CamENCYCLOPEDLA
OF REAL Esbridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187 (1928); EDITHJ. FRIEDMAN,
TATE APPRAISING
164, 365, 684, 1011 (1968); Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth
Controls: An Economic and Legal h l y s i s , 86 YALEL.J. 385, 490-92 (1977).
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acquires an interest in real property (or expends funds in the
capital improvement of an existing interest), they may be said
to acquire Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations
("R.I.B.E.").~~It is then, as a t no other time in commercial activity, that constitutional rights intersect with the marketplace?
The operative word in R.I.B.E. is "reasonable." To determine "reasonableness" one must ask which value-defining expectations are credible within the range of all possible schemes
for land use a t the moment of investment." Would a reasonable actor in the marketplace ignore local, private, and public
nuisance laws which prohibit any economically viable use?"
Would a n actor reasonably ignore existing zoning and subdivision code prohibitions, or the possibility of favorable or adverse

85. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992).
For a stunning illustration of some unpleasant but vital R.1.B.E.-driven truths
about capital investment in land and its effects on economic behavior, consider the
recent conduct by the South Carolina Coastal Council. After successive legal defeats
in the Lucas case, the Council recently settled the matter and purchased the fee
simple title to the Lucas lands for $1.5 million. Eschewing its former regulatory
behavior, the Council promptly canceled its open spacelerosion control regulatory
scheme and decided t o market the lands for private residential development in
order to recoup its capital investment. The Council's array of ecology-preserving
principles was of insufficient weight once cash was actually on the line. Richard
Miniter, The Shifting Ground of Property Rights, INSIGHTMAG., Aug. 23 1993, at
4, 9.
86. The quest for a determination of fair market value, by definition, includes
the concept of the marketplace. This is identical to the calculation of value at a
given point in time pursuant to whatever equation is used for purposes of Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations ("R.I.B.E."). It is predicated upon the reasonable, lawful expectations of a property owner at the time in question, and the
search is to determine the value of the land which has been lost to governmental
regulation, either permanently or temporarily, and for which compensation must be
paid pursuant to the Fifth Amendment. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899-2900; and upon
remand, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992).
87. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
88. NORMANWILLIAMS,JR. & JOHN
M. TAYLOR,AMERICANPLANNING
LAW:
LAND USE AND THE POLICEPOWER$8 5A.14, 5A.15; see also MANDELKER,supra
note 45, $8 6.05, 6.08, 6.13-6.15. Although the United States Supreme Court stayed
away fiom zoning decisions for half a century subsequent to Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), a very rich body of law has developed with regard
to zoning changes in state practice. There is considerable emphasis on the status
of the existing zoning regulations, appropriate terms for the amortization of nonconforming improvements or businesses established in reliance upon previous zoning regulations, and the interaction between private use restrictions and zoning
regulations. By and large, this body of law reflects a series of accommodations
between the public desire for changed land use and respect for the private investments made previously in reliance upon the pre-existing status of land regulations.
See MANDELKER, supra note 45, $8 5.65, 9.20.
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zoning changes, or the future enactment of seriously adverse
environmental r e s t r i ~ t i o n s ?Such
~ ~ laws affect value because
they modify the reasonable expectations of the actor in the
marketplace with an impact equal to such important elements
as location, availability of financing, and technical marketability of title.g0
A. Which Laws?
R.I.B.E. determinations are relevant in all Takings Clause
settings, not merely in the "categorical formulation" found in
L u ~ a s . ~Nevertheless,
'
the Lucas case comes closer than any
other decision to fixing the scope of those laws that help to
define the R.I.B.E. of any real property.g2 At first blush one
would assume that principles of realism require the following
be examined as the basis of any R.I.B.E.:
(1)Marketplace realism which looks to all value-affecting
laws, ordinances and regulations from state, local, or federal
sources.g3 F'rom this perspective, the experienced real estate
practitioner would be aware of such divergent laws as the current local zoning,g4subdivision and building codes, state flood
control reg~lations:~the federal Americans with Disabilities
and an array of environmental laws from all levels of

89. See MANDELKER,supra note 45, §$ 6.05, 6.08.
90. See supra note 88.
91. 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8.
92. Id. at 2901, 2902 n.18.
93. Title insurance is a standardized industry, by and large, throughout the
nation with American Land Title Association ("ALTA") forms being the most popular by a wide margin. ROBERTKRATOVIL
& RAYMOND
J. WERNER,REALESTATE
LAW 175 (7th ed. 1979). One also wonders which value-impacting regulations, that
have no relationship to title itself, would be seen as R.1.B.E.-determining. Would
the FHA and VA design and subdivision regulations be relevant to R.I.B.E. in
supra note 84; see also WILLIAMS,supm note 88,
residential areas? See FRIEDMAN,
5A.14. Among lawyers who specialize in commercial real estate development
projects, it is commonplace when acquiring land to make the acquisition contract
conditional upon buyer's satisfactory investigations into zoning, soil conditions, and
potential environmental problems (if not using a straightforward option for these
same purposes). Accordingly, the R.I.B.E. for such projects are well. along the way
to definition through party activity before money changes hands between the buyer
and seller. In fact, of several dozen such commercial transactions that co-author
Burton has been involved with, virtually none involving sizable investment has
been without the use of such R.1.B.E.-determining conditions since the late 1970s.
94. WILLIAMS,
supm note 88, 8 5A.14.
95. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
US. 304 (1987).
96. 42 U.S.C. 8 12101 (Supp. I1 1990 & Supp. I11 1991).
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government."
(2) Legal realism requires the inclusion of the above plus
all existing case law principles-including Supreme Court and
other judge-made Takings Clause doctrines which bear on property rights." To the extent that some statist-favoring judicial
doctrines would permit government to regulate the use of property without payment of just compensation to the landowner,
R.I.B.E. would be diminished in value." To the extent that
some privatist-favoring doctrines would prevent uncompensated
regulations, the value of R.I.B.E. would be enhanced.100
(3) Legal realism also would import the wide variety of
judge-made doctrines regarding valuation which have evolved
in direct eminent domain cases.lol Eminent domain doctrines
97. R.I.B.E., realistically computed, would include a lawyer-like inquiry into
such value-impacting regulations of land use and development as Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA" or
"Superfind Act"), 42 U.S.C. 8 9601 (1988); Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. 7401
(1988), and similar federal or state laws and regulations which often substantially
affect the use (and hence the value) of any parcel of land located in the United
States. Although the U.S. Highway Beautification Act originally anticipated the use
of eminent domain by the states to remove billboards, screen junk yards, and otherwise create aesthetically visual easements along the interstate highway system,
many states seek to use police power regulations to amortize billboard investments
and remove these "eyesores." 23 U.S.C. 5 131 (1988); KRATOVIL& WERNER,supra
note 93. This presents an interesting "federalism" of laws impacting R.I.B.E. determinations along the interstate system.
98. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2903 (1992)
( K e ~ e d y J.,
, concurring in judgment).
99. It is important, in this regard, to note that even Justice Scalia, in his
opinion in Nollan, conceded that a variety of forms of government exactions upon
the use of private property would be constitutionally sustained by the Court. 483
US. 825, 834, 836 (1987). Moreover, in Lucas, Justice Scalia recognized in dicta a t
least two areas where the governmental entities could prohibit all use and thereby
deprive the owner of all value without the payment of just compensation: prohibiting illegal activities such as breweries on the property and destroying property in
order to prevent destruction or death in surrounding areas under the "firebreak"
notions. 112 S. Ct. a t 2899 11.14, 2900 n.16. Accordingly, the R.I.B.E. must be
determined with a firm recognition that not merely local nuisance and property
laws are applicable, but the entire evolving body of Takings Clause jurisprudence
emanating from the Supreme Court in recent times applies as well.
100. The concept of the "categorical formulation" set forth in Lucas is a prime
example of the private property owner's rights pursuant to the Takings Clause
being accorded a position paramount to state regulation. 112 S. Ct. at 2895. Moreover, the per se rule found in Loretto also accords the private property owner a
nearly absolute position to demand compensation for governmental activities having
an impact upon property value, regardless of the trivial nature of such impact.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U S . 419, 434-35 (1982).
101. See MANDELKER,supra note 45, $8 8.19-8.23; PATRICKJ. ROHAN &
MELVINA. RESKIN, NICHOLSON EMINENTDOMAIN$5 12.01[3], 12.01[5] (Toby P.
Brigham & Gideon Kunner eds., rev. 3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter NICHOLS].
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control such matters a s the potential for zoning changes and
variances, whether favorable102 or unfavorable to the landowner,lo3 partial takings and remainder parcels.'" Estoppel
principles and other pertinent legal or equitable doctrines could
also be rationally imported into R.I.B.E. analysis.lo5
Although R.I.B.E. determinations seem to cry out for the
use of such principles, ironically Lucas is not a n opinion
steeped in legal or marketplace realism, but quite the contrary.'06 Justice Scalia's opinion, taken a s a whole, sets forth
the following, strikingly narrow, R.1.B.E.-determining measurements:
(1) Pre-existent Takings Clause jurisprudence, especially
statist-favoring principles of the harm-prevention line of cases,
will not be looked to in R.I.B.E. determinations.lo7
(2) Exceptions may (or may not) exist for emergency action
doctrines and prohibiting unlawful activities as a surviving
residue of the harm-prevention cluster of doctrine.'"
(3) The relevant law to be examined is local property and
tort iaw.log
(4) With substantial borrowings from the Restatement of
Property, Lucas sets forth a six-element test for determining
the extent to which local property and tort law depress the
R.I.B.E. value.' lo
102. See NICHOLS,supra note 101, $ 12C.02[31.
103. Id.
104. MANDELKER, supra note 45, §$ 8.19-8.23; NICHOLS, supra note 101,
$5 7:8.05[2][C] n.73, 12D.10[31.
105. For example, there exists a line of cases where conduct by the municipal
government gives rise to estoppel of the government and a result more favorable to
the landowner, although such estoppel principles are very narrowly applied. See
MANDELKER,
supra note 45, $§ 6.14-6.20; NICHOLS,supra note 101, §§ 8.20[21,
8.20[3].
106. The separate concurring opinion by Justice K e ~ e d yis quite informative
in this regard. 112 S. Ct. at 2902-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
107. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897-99.
108. Id. at 2899 11.14, 2900 n.16.
109. Id. at 2900, 2901-02.
110. The six factors to be weighed, according to Justice Scalia's majority opinion, could lead to something of a paradox. The normal presumption-burden of proof
allocation of regulatory takings law results in a decision favorable to government
"if any state of fads either known or which could be reasonably assumed affords
support for it." Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962) (citing United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938)). Accordingly, as things
stand now, the burden of proof is upon the private property owner, not the government, and any missing factors from Justice Scalia's six-element formula for determining R.I.B.E.would be resolved favorably to the government until such presumption and burden are changed. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 n.6.

PREDATORY GOVERNMENTAL ZONING
Because the Lucas facts involved the unique situation
where 100% of the land's value had been lost to the governmental regulation, one might argue that the R.1.B.E.-determining formula is not meant to apply to the "normal" situation
where less than 100% of value has been lost."' This narrow
reading of Lucas is not warranted in view of the powerN recent momentum in reconfiguration of the Takings Clause.
B. Laws As of When?
Local tort and property laws that determine R.I.B.E. are
not deemed to be fluid or susceptible of adaptation. Under
Lucas these laws are looked to as of the time the landowner
acquired R.1.B.E.-an approach to the law as if frozen in amber."' This curious result is perhaps a n unintended byproduct of Justice Scalia's repugnance for the harm-prevention
cluster of statist-favoring cases. One way in which he deals
with this inconvenient body of law is to deny its force rather
than face up to a direct elimination or severe modification of
the harm-prevention d~ctrine.''~The reason for this unrealistic approach is obvious: if the Lucas Court had openly overruled or modified the harm-prevention line of cases it would

111. Considerable dicta in Justice Scalia's opinion suggests that neither 100%
of all of the parcel of land need be taken, nor 100% of all the value-perhaps just
100% of the value of a single strand of property right within the bundle will suffice. 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8.
112. Id. at 2899.
113. Justice Scalia repeatedly diminishes the force of the Mugler-type line of
cases represented in the second cluster. He indicates that they were merely early
historical expressions of some general notions of the police power. Id. at 2896-97.
He ignores the existence of any categorical doctrine favoring government while
conceding that much language in earlier cases may have indicated that a governmental preference did exist. Id. at 2897. Contradictions are strewn throughout the
opinion and other opinions in which Justice Scalia has joined. For example, even
in Lucas he suggests at various points that the "firebreak" doctrine would probably
continue to exist as a part of the second cluster. Id. at 2900 n.16. He further
suggests that the absolute prohibition by government of illegal activities such as
beer breweries, without the payment of compensation, would continue to exist as a
part of the harm-prevention cluster. Id. at 2899 n.14.
Moreover, in First English Evanagelical Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 304 (1987), Justice Scalia joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, where the Court explicitly stated that it was remanding the case for determination of whether the government would be insulated from the requirement to pay
just compensation even though all useful value was taken from the property (clearly what Justice Scalia in Lucas calls a "categorical formulation*) because such
activity by government was insulated against payment under the harm-prevention
doctrine of Mugler and its progeny. Id. at '318-20.
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have created a precedent for the alteration of R.1.B.E.-determining laws.114 By openly eliminating a statist-favoring doctrine in Lucas, Justice Scalia would have established the precedent for eliminating a privatist-favoring doctrine in some future cases, and this would make the R.I.B.E. formula subject to
future Takings Clause cases.
The Court's current (and mostly correct) privatist-oriented
view of the Takings Clause would be jeopardized by any precedent that suggested future changes in case law could affect any
R.I.B.E. 'I5 To avoid this hazard, the R.1.B.E.-affecting laws
are fixed in time.

C. Losses of Less Than 100% of Value
As previously noted, Lucas represents the highly unusual
fact of a loss of 100% of property v a l u ~ art least such was
the factual basis of the Supreme Court's decision.ll6 But what
of the more "normal" circumstance? Is Lucas susceptible of
being extended to such cases? The opinion in Lucas strongly
suggests that the R.I.B.E. determination formula will be material to lesser value lotkes."'
First, in some textual and footnoted exchanges between the
Lucas majority and the dissenting Justices, it appears that
although the "categorical formulation" of Lucas is only triggered by 100% loss,11s the R.I.B.E. formulation is not.llg
Moreover, the all-points attack on the harm-prevention line of
cases strongly suggests that Lucas addresses more than the
rare case where 100% of property value has been 1 0 s t . l ~ ~
I n addition, Lucas lays down several highly visible markers which signal that 100% loss may be defined as less than
100% i n future cases. Much Lucas dicta expressly identifies a
number of concepts which would allow such a result. For in-

114. Justice Scalia faced a logical dilemma. If he had realistically stated that
the harm-prevention line of cases flowing from Mugler was being set aside or substantially diminished in Lucas, this would lead to the conclusion that takings law
could be modified by the Court in a fashion which has an impact upon
R.1.B.E.-though such impact in Lucas would be favorable to the private property
owner.
115. Supra note 114.
116. Lucas, 112 S . Ct. at 2889, 2896.
117. See supra note 111:
118. 112 S . Ct. at 2895 n.8.
119. Id.
120. See supra note 111,
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stance, the Lucas opinion actively speculates as to whether a
100% loss, not of the entire fee simple but of only one strand
from the bundle of rights, would open to the private landowner
the new constitutional protection of the "categorical formulation."l2' Prior decisions such as Penn Central12' and Keystone,'= according to Lucas, never foreclosed this "single
strand" gambit by the private owner.'"
Moreover, Lucas dicta also speculates about the issue of a
100% value loss on a strip of land that is a part of a larger
parcel.lZ5 If a strip of land-less than the entire private
owner's parcel-loses 100% of its value because of government
regulation, Lucas hints that the "categorical formulation" may
~ ~ would certainly bring into
protect the 1 a n d o ~ n e r . l(This
play the existing body of takings lore that deals with partial
takings, severance damages, statist-favoring statutory rules of
compensation such as those in Arkansas,12' and some constitutionally profound questions about smaller tracts as self-sufficient economic units within larger parcels of land.)'''

121. See supra note 111.
122. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
123. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
124. 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8.
125. Id. at 2894 n.7; see NICHOLS,
supra note 101, 5 12B.14[4].
126. 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
127. Arkansas, for example, has a statutory "before-and-after" method of computation designed to subtract from the taking damages awarded to the landowner
the amount of any enhancement in value of the remainder parcel attributable to
the public project. Property Owners Improvement Dist. v. Williford, 843 S.W.2d
862, 866 (Ark. Ct. App. 1992). Consider whether such a statute is constitutionally
appropriate where predatory government gamesmanship has been present in the
taking process. In those condemnation actions where both government and the
private landowner concede that the remainder parcel lost some value, then a "before-and-after" test would seem appropriate to determine aggregate loss to the
entire tract. Morales v. Chrysler Realty Corp., 843 S.W.2d 275, 278 (Tex. Ct. App.
1992).
128. Generally, the determination of fair market value when less than the
entire tract is taken presents a series of technical questions, some of which are
often deemed to be fact issues and some of which are deemed to be questions of
law grounded in constitutional protections:
(1) The value of the strip of land taken measured by all uses-including the
highest and best use to which it could reasonably be adapted within the foreseeable future-represents a portion of the total fair market value.
(2) The increased value of the remainder, if enhanced by reason of the public
project, will not be used as a setoff against the just compensation due to the landowner.
(3) The decreased value of the remainder resulting from severance from the
condemned land will be an additional element of compensation.
(4) In many cases the question of value turns on the size and configuration of
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I n both instances, Lucas leaves the door conspicuously
open to later enlargement of the private owner's rights where
less than 100% of the fee simple value of the entire tract is lost
to regulation. Whether such a n enlargement will come to include the absolute privatist protections of the "categorical formulation" found in Lucas is uncertain, but on balance the dicta
lean that way.lZgGiven these open invitations to private owners, it would be foolhardy for a private owner faced with predatory municipal regulatory conduct to ignore using the "categorical formulation," even where less than 100% of the land area
was taken by government's predatory regulation^.'^^ I t would
be equally foolish to ignore Lucas's R.1.B.E .-determining formula in a predatory takings case where one of the property rights
strands, but not a discrete parcel of land, was taken.13'

D. A Potential R.I.B.E. Synthesis
The existence of Lucas's frozen-in-amber time frame as to
the relevant body of R.1.B.E.-determining law and its myopic
approach of looking only to local tort and property law are not
dispositive of other existing doctrines.'" First, the sources of
a self-sufficient economic unit ("unit"), which must be determined as to the value
of the strip taken and also a s to the value of the remainder.
(5) Sometimes (i) the. strip taken is itself a "unit"; sometimes (ii) the strip
taken plus some but not all of the remaining entire tract is the appropriate "unit";
(iii) sometimes the entire tract including the strip taken is the appropriate "unit."
(6) Some jurisdictions allow the landowner unilaterally to waive severance damages, and have value turn solely upon class (5)(i); and some even allow the landowner unilaterally to select class (5)(ii). The landowner's key strategy will be to
avoid averaging the value of some larger portion of land than the strip taken
when this will yield a lower value for the strip taken because the remainder's
value is lower than that of the strip alone.
(7) Accordingly, selection of the appropriate "unit" can be crucial to valuation.
Some jurisdictions will allow the government to present evidence to the jury of
what constitutes the appropriate "unit" rather than a unilateral designation by the
landowner.
When predatory municipal conduct creates the taking, it may be particularly
inimical to the policies of the Takings Clause to allow the state to thereafter oppose the landowner's selection of the appropriate economic "unit." Such could result
in averaging the value of a less valuable remainder parcel with a more valuable
taken strip, thus arriving a t a fair market value for the taken strip which does
not reflect its reasonable fair market value either standing alone as a "unit" or as
part of some ideal, smaller-than-everything "unit." See State v. Windham, 837
S.W.2d 73, 76-78 (Tex. 1992); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Ramsey, 542 S.W.2d
466, 471 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976); NICHOLS,supra note 101, $ 12.03[1].
129. 112 S. Ct. at 2894-95.
130. See supra note 128.
131. 112 S. Ct. a t 2895 n.8.
132. I t could be argued that local property law, broadly defined, would include
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R.1.B.E.-determining laws need not necessarily be limited to
local tort and property law. The open invitation found in Lucas
for private owners to further explore the possibilities of utilizing the "categorical formulation" for losses of less than 100% of
property value admits that further judicial refinement will
have a major impact.lsg Such an invitation is a tacit acknowledgment that evolving Takings Clause legal doctrines bear
directly upon the R.I.B.E. calculus.134 For this and other reasons noted below, local tort and property law cannot truly be
intended to be the sole sources of law for R.I.B.E. determinations.
In addition, it seems reasonable that some of Lucas's six
R.1.B.E.-determining elements are broad enough or pliable
enough to import into them some of the elements of legal realism otherwise excluded from that 0pini0n.l~~
Moreover, Justice Kennedy's separate concurring opinion also illustrates
receptivity to a broader spectrum of legal sources, even among
~ example, the Restatement
privatist-oriented J u s t i ~ e s . ' For
of Property's inquiry into questions of suitability or social value
of the private owner's uses (as part of the R.1.B.E.-determining
legal inquiry) appears to allow inquiry into law and regulations
beyond local tort and property law.13' The Restatement inquiries into new or changed circumstances or new knowledge also
lend themselves to examining a broader range of regulatory
laws? The inquiry into uniformity or equal protection issues

any laws and regulations which affect real property value. In other words, Justice
Scalia could assert, in defense of his limitation to local law, a notion that federal
statutes and decisions which have any impact upon property value are embraced
within the notion of local property law. If thus broadly defined, the objections
raised by Justice Kennedy in the separate concurring opinion would become moot.
112 S. Ct. at 2895, 2903.
133. See supra note 114.
134. See supra not4 98 and accompanying text.
135. Compare Lucas, 112 S. Ct. a t 2900-01 with Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623, 664 (1887); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410-11 (1915); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 US.
590, 592 (1962); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
485 (1987).
136. Contrast Justice K e ~ e d y ' sreceptivity with the healthy hostility towards
legislative determinations found in Justice Scalia's Lwas opinion. 112 S. Ct. at
2898 n.12 (only a "stupid staff' of a legislature would fail to be artful enough to
fit Justice Blackmuds standard); id. at 2899 n.14 (legislatures may go about "plundering landowners").
137. Id. at 2901.
138. The Restatement of Property's material criteria are the same as the case
law. For instance, Miller examines the degree of harm to nearby private property
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respecting dissimilar regulatory treatment of other landowners
also opens the door t o much non-local constitutional doctrine.13'
In light of all this, Lucas cannot rationally be read as having fixed a definitive and final limit on the laws germane t o
R.I.B.E. calculations.140

E. R.I.B.E. Timing and Predatory Municipal Practices
Naturally, not all governmental regulatory conduct which
occurs amid land value fluctuations amounts t o a compensable
taking. Normal delays involving zoning or other legislative
activity do not work a compensable regulatory taking, even
though property values may drop.'" Such fluctuations are
among the ordinary incidents of o~nership.'~'Predatory municipal gamesmanship is quite another matter for purposes of
Takings Clause analysis.'43 Exactly when is a private
landowner's property taken by predatory municipal actions that
constitute a regulatory taking cause of action in inverse condemnation? The R.I.B.E. calculus found in Lucas would lead to
the conclusion that the date of private acquisition or other
investment is the critical date for R.I.B.E. ~alculation.'~~
However, such a reading can be traced to the particular factual
circumstances of Lucas. At the time Lucas acquired the land,
the then-existing land regulations allowed him to build a sin-

("serious injury" to commercial apple orchards within a two-mile radius of the
claimant's property); the social value of claimant's land use activities (ornamental
and timber use of relatively small value compared to the apple industry's suitability t o the locality in question); ease of harm avoidance measures (a necessity test
under which the state entomologist determines whether cedar tree destruction will
b e , necessary to protect nearby apple orchards); longevity of claimant's use or
changed circumstances in the locale, or new knowledge making former permissible
use no longer permissible (the scientifically established details underlying the enactment of the statute and the need for ten neighbors to request an investigation
show both elements to be present). 276 U.S. at 277-80. For similar factor-weighing,
see Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S.590, 594-97 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394, 410-14 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 657-63 (1887); First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893,
899-901 (Ct.App. 1989).
139. 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8.
140. See supra note 138.
141. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 320 (1987).
142. Id.
143. See supra note 3.
144. 112 S. Ct. at 2899-900.
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gle-family re~idence.'~~
Subsequently enacted land use restrictions prohibited construction (and the courts below determined that the property owner had been deprived of all effective use of the land, hence 100% of its value).'46 Thus, the
R.I.B.E. inquiry formulated by the Lucas Court would look only
to the tort and property laws bearing upon the land's value a t
the time of Lucas's acquisition.14'
This formulation would not be suitable, however, in many
instances of predatory regulatory takings. For example, suppose that a private owner has owned a strip of land parallel to
a highway for, many years. Its current use is quite valuable
since it is rented to a nearby business for parking o r for sign
pylons and billboards. As is customary in such transactions, the
rent escalates periodically, and the capitalized value of those
increased rents'48 represents a large and rising fair market
value to the owner. Suppose that, in order to condemn the strip
of land in the future for highway expansion purposes, various
agencies of government collaborate in a predatory fashion to
dislodge the tenant by altering the signage ordinance or revoking the signage permit. If a court determined that these precondemnation steps were taken to destroy private value to
obtain a future public right-of-way expansion at a lower price,
then relief would likely be available under the seventh cluster
of Takings Clause doctrines.'49
Under such predatory circumstances, the more appropriate
way to calculate R.I.B.E. would be to look to the legal status of
the property as it existed just before the municipal governing
bodies began their predatory activities.'" It would not be sensible to value the land on the earlier dates when it was fmst
acquired or when the improvements were first built. After all,
145. Id. at 2889.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2900.
148. FRIEDMAN,supm note 84, at 677-78 (listing the factors to be considered
in leaseholds).
149. See cases cited supra notes 3-5.
150. In this connection, it is significant to note the Court's increasing skepticism towards local governmental land use regulations. The heightened judicial
scrutiny, the necessity for overcoming the historical presumptions of correctness of
governmental regulation, and the heavy weight the Court attaches to long-standing
property rights inherent in fee simple ownership, all argue in favor of granting the
landowner the benefit of values at the earliest possible date prior to the commencement of predatory activities. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
112 S. Ct. 2886, 2898 n.12, 2899-900 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S.825, 831, 837, 840-41 (1987).

854

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993

the reasonable economic expectations of a n owner with improvements in place, a lease signed, and a tenant in occupancy
are certainly not less than the fair market value of such income-producing property immediately before the government
began its predatory actions.151 The earlier date of raw land
acquisition would not represent the reality of the R.I.B.E. baseline. Accordingly, the status of law applicable to income-generating property when predatory conduct first began seems the
only sensible R.1.B.E.-determining body of law to be investigated. In a normal market, this method of R.I.B.E. calculation will
protect the owner's increasing values, and such a result harmonizes with the overall anti-statist philosophy of lucas.'"

F. R.I.B.E. and Temporary or Permanent Regulatory Taking
First English established, among other things, that the
private property owner's cause of action for regulatory taking is
derived directly from the Constitution and is available for both
temporary and permanent takings.'53 In 1992 the South Carolina court, upon remand in Lucas, dealt with the element of
temporary takings in a detailed fashion? The court identified prior periods of time for which just compensation was due
for temporary takings and expressly identified future possible
temporary takings dependent upon future governmental regulatory
This feature leads to the inquiry as to exactly how the
R.I.B.E. formulation should be dealt with for a period of temporary predatory taking. The logic inherent in the Lucas analysis
151. To the extent that the Takings Clause has been interpreted over the past
century to include a prohibition of governmental regulation which destroys private
land values or otherwise interferes with the enjoyment of the fee simple in the
fashion as indicated in Clusters 1 through 7, see znfm Conflguration A, the choice
of any date which yields a minimal return to the property owner subsequent to
the commencement of predatory steps by the government would frustrate the judicial tendencies pursuant to Cluster 1, Cluster 5, and Cluster 7. This would be
highly unlikely when the government itself has precipitated the regulation through
predatory conduct, not merely through some Euclidian zoning principle or other
protected statist activities.
152. Lucas emphasizes its skepticism of value-destroying governmental activities throughout the opinion. See, e.g., 112 S. Ct. at 2894, 2895 n.8, 2898 11.12,
2900, 2901-02.
153. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 315, 318 (1987).
154. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 485-86 (S.C.
1992).
155. Id.
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leads t o several conclusions. First, predatory governmental
conduct is most often achieved by means of local land use regulatory activities; hence, on the surface, the R.I.B.E. calculation
under Lucas would seemingly include such value-affecting
regulation^.'^^ However, because it is the very predatory regulation itself that generates a regulatory taking, the R.I.B.E.
cannot include all municipal use of regulatory power. Because
the predatory regulatory takings cases usually include not one
but an interwoven series of governmental acts (discouraging
tenants, revising zoning or building ordinances, crimping fire
and police protection, limiting access, harassing inspections
being among the most frequent tactics employed by local government~),'~'it may be necessary to seek to sort out some
non-predatory R.1.B.E.-affecting laws from others which are
predatory. This would be a statist-benefitting approach since
local laws and regulations would not be invidious if they were
not part of a pattern of predatory regulation. Some sorting out
would be needed. The Lucas opinion brushed aside the historic
deference to legislative action. There is a long and, until recently, potent tradition of honoring the presumption of legislative
correctness in zoning and other land use regulation cases-although this presumption has been called into question.15' A shift in the presumption of legislative correctness
might be appropriate to force the government to carry the burden of sorting out the predatory from non-predatory conduct to
determine when the predatory conduct commenced.'"
A more privatist-orientedview of this issue is also possible.
The Supreme Court has expressed strong skepticism towards
governmental conduct in Takings Clause cases. The Court has
indicated its "closer judicial scrutiny" of the heightened risks to

156. It is important to note that, literally, Justice Scalia referred to local tort
and property law. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899-902. However, the ability of local
government to affect property uses, and hence property values, through local ordinance and regulation is a t the very core of the Takings Clause evolution. It would
constitute a supreme paradox if, in fad, these value-diminishing regulations and
ordinances were in effect permitted to undermine private values simultaneously
with their being the core of a challenge to the conduct by the government itself
pursuant to the Cluster 7 predatory cases. See supra notes 3-5.
157. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
159. The judicial skepticism noted above tends powerfully to push towards a
reassignment of presumptions and burdens of proof. See Bruce W. Burton, Predatory Municipal Zoning Practices: Changing the Presumption of Constitutionality in the
Wake of the "Takings Trilogy," 44 ARK E. REV.65, 96-105 (1991).
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private rights whenever government attempts land use exactions; the majority's recent cynicism about legislative motives
in this area is not masked. Thus, if the Court finds a predatory
pattern of regulatory actions, perhaps all local laws should be
excluded from R.I.B.E. calculations-an extreme privatist-oriented outcome,160
Such an outcome could be possible, even likely. The
Rehnquist-Scalia combination has exercised extraordinary force
in Takings Clause matters in recent years.l6l If that power
center remains intact, and since predatory municipal conduct
presents the local legislative body in its most unflattering and
rent-seeking light, not much in the way of judicial deference
toward local ordinances and regulations should be expected in
R.I.B.E. cal~ulations.'~~
This could prove to be a large economic benefit to the private landowner since the parcel's value
would be calculated subject only to local tort law restrictions
and, perhaps, some prior benign zoning which pre-dates the
government's predatory abuses.lm
Quite ap& from these important policy features and the
issues concerning presumptions and burdens of proof lies the
question of how value calculations should be approached in the
many variables of predatory regulation cases which now fall
within the purview of the Court's new R.I.B.E. exposition.

IV. THE MECHANICS
OF VALUECALCULATIONS
b

Payment of "just compensation" is the constitutional requirement for both direct eminent domain and the indirect
confiscation of private property rights by regulatory takings?
In the area of conventional eminent domain (a
straightforward condemnation without government's regulatory
conduct being a t issue), there is a considerable body of doctrine
concerning value determinations. The fact that formal condem-

160. In the event that the Court, led by Justice Scalia, is intent upon crushing
the last vestiges of Cluster 2, such an extreme position could be expected. However, within the anti-statist camp with respect to Takings Clause questions, Justices
O ' C o ~ o r , K e ~ e d y ,and Souter appear moderately inclined in this regard. See
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2902, 2925; Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 153134 (1992).
161. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2902, 2925; Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct.
1522, 1531-34 (1992).
162. Compare supra notes 3-5 with note 150.
163. See 112 S. Ct. at 2901.
164. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48-49 (1960).
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nation proceedings are not instituted does not change the essential nature of the claim, and the condemnee's rights are not
qualified by the form of the remedy.lB5Since 1987, private
causes of action to recover just compensation for regulatory
takings and conventional condemnations have both been directly grounded in the identical provisions of the Fifth Amendment.lB6As such, virtually identical calculations should be
used to determine the value of the property rights appropriated
by government in both types of taking^.'^'
The critical issue is whether the rules governing "valuation
timing" protect the private property rights embraced by the
Fifth Amendment so as to encourage investment by discouraging the state's predatory misuse of its vast regulatory powers.
In theory at least, the timing of such valuation could be pegged
at one of six possible, and widely distinct, moments. Logically,
an individual's R.I.B.E. for property being condemned could be
valued at the time of (i) original acquisition, (ii) the most recent
investment for capital improvements, (iii) formal state action
announcing or designating the project, (iv) actual predatory
state conduct, (v) the court or condemnation commission's
award determination, or (vi) the actual payment of the award.
The correct choice of timing sigdicantly impacts the calculation of the value being determined.
Because diminution of the value of the property taken by
government is at the very core of any pattern of municipal
predatory land regulation, the landowner in such a scenario
must make calculations involving several considerations.

A. Interests Taken
Just compensation is required for takings of any interest in
property.'@ The taking of a property interest amounting to
less than fee ownership requires compensation measured by
the extent of the interest taken?' Consideration of Lucas's
new "categorical formulation" and its potential application t o
takings of less than all strands of the fee simple needs to be

165. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933).
166. ,First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 321 (1987).
167. See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse CO: v. United States, 409 U S .
470, 473-74 (1973).
168. Zinsmeyer v. State, 646 S.W.2d 626, 628 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
169. Fordyce v. Wolfe, 18 S.W. 145 (Tex. 1891).

858

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993

factored into the calculus of any regulatory taking.
In Texas, ancillary losses, such as the regulatory deprivation of special values attributable to the property's unique
suitability for the conduct of a particular business, can be introduced as evidence in establishing the market value of just
compensation. Some states liberally permit wide-ranging
evidence, by statute or constitution. For example, while Texas
eminent domain statutes allow compensation for damages to
real property only, the Texas Constitution provides for compensation for the taking, damaging, or destruction of all species of
property. This includes, importantly, any unreasonable or unnecessary damage to a business, even one whose value consists
exclusively of good will, such as a restaurant.17' The Texas
Constitution also provides for compensation for lost profits in
some instan~es."~
In City of Austin v. Casiraghi, the court held that such
constitutional damages need t o be pled as a separate cause of
action to be joined in the statutory condemnation action.173It
should be noted that Texas is one of the majority of states
which constitutionally mandate compensation for both the
property taken and damage to or destruction of the reminder
of the property caused by governmental action.lT4Texas requires damages t o be valued by the same willing buyer-seller
standard as is used t o value takings.175

B. Considerations in Picking the Date of Property Valuation
It is critical to the spirit of the emerging Takings Clause
doctrine that the rules governing "valuation timing" be formulated t o advance at least two primary societal goals. First, as
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, the rules should protect
against uncompensated or unjustly compensated takings of private property rights. Second, timing and valuation rules should
be properly structured t o encourage investment by discouraging
the state's predatory gamesmanship or other abuses of the
governing process. Accordingly, determining the date for mea-

170. City of Austin v. Casiraghi, 656 S.W.2d 576, 581 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
171. L-M-S Inc. v. Blackwell, 233 S.W.2d 286, 291 (Tex. 1950).
172. See City of Austin v. Avenue Corp., 704 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Tex. 1986).
173. Casiraghi, 656 S.W.2d at 579-80.
174. F. Russell Kendall, Special and Community DamageeA Confusion in
Definition, 10 HOUS.L. REV.282, 282 (1972).
175. City of Austin v. C a ~ i z z o 267
,
S.W.2d 808, 812 (Tex. 1954).
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suring fair market value payable to the landowner is particularly vital when the values have changed during the condemnation process. Such a determination becomes increasingly difficult when the condemnation is not a direct taking but involves
predatory municipal practices. There are four primary situations which may be involved:
Situation A: The landowner's parcel gains value during
the proceedings because of economic circumstances unrelated to the public project. For instance, a landowner's farmland becomes more valuable due to an increase in the market price of the crop grown on it.
Situation B: The parcel appreciates in value during the
same time period due to the market's anticipation of the
project's impact, such as the enhanced value due to upgraded highway frontage resulting from the project.
Situation C: During the condemnation process the
property loses value due to economic circumstances not
caused by the public project.
Situation D: The land value drops because of the
market's anticipation of the project's negative impact on
the land's productivity.
As presented in Situation A, the landowner should be able
to collect the enhanced value attributable only to general economic conditions unrelated to the prospective highway. This
gain represents a normal benefit of fee simple ownership, and
"just compensation" would seem to embrace this growth i n
value until the owner has been paid and can invest the
funds. '76
Under Situation B, the landowner would receive none of
the enhanced value since all of it was attributable to the public
project.ln Under Situation C, the decline in value normally
would be borne by the landowner.'" The loss would also be
borne by the landowner in Situation D, even if the
government's predatory conduct consisted of delay which postponed the payment date. However, if such delay were exces~ i v e ' ' ~or accompanied by either undue governmental interference with the owner's use and enjoyment of the property'"

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Barshop v. City of Houston, 442 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tex. 1969).
Id.
State v. Vaughan, 319 S.W.2d 349, 355 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
Barshop, 442 S.W.2d at 685.
Thurow v. City of Dallas, 499 S.W.2d 347, 348 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973),

+
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or surrounding condemnations which left the targeted parcel as
an obviously mandatory future taking, the landowner may be
entitled to c~mpensation.'~'These Texas holdings are squarely consistent with the overall predatory-gamesmanship line of
cases.
Under current Texas law, which is somewhat statist-oriented, the date of value computation usually will be the actual
date of the award's payment by the government to the landowner.'" Normally this will be the same time as the award
determination by the commissioners. However, Texas's eminent
domain statutes require the state to pay a t that time only if it
needs to take pos~ession.'~If either party objects to the
award, there will be a trial de novo on all issues, including
value, which normally will not be determined until the award
is paid.'" This rule opens the door for predatory state conduct prior t o the award's payment. Essentially the state is
given an option to buy a t the price of the commissioner's
award. The state may then object to that award--delay payment, withholding its "time-value" from the condemnee-and
then pay later, either when it needs to take possession or after
the market value of the land has dropped to reflect the reality
of the damage caused by the condemnation.
One thesis of this Article is that such an approach, found
in some current law, is inconsistent with constitutional takings
analysis. The historic, underlying policy premises of the Takings Clause should, at least, preclude statutes which encourage
undue delay and predatory conduct by the gove~mment.Further, consistency with the Fifth Amendment demands that
whenever government is found to have an incentive to act in a
predatory or rent-seeking fashion toward the private landowner, the law should require procedural and valuation rules
which remove the incentive and deter such conduct.
There is a spectrum of approaches, ranging from extremely
privatist to moderate orientations, which would help deter such
predatory abuse of private property rights. The most privatistoriented approach might award all value increases to the land-

error refhsed n.r.e. (1974).
181. Uehlinger v. State, 387 S.W.2d 427, 432 (Tex. Civ. App.), error refused
n.r.e. (1965).
182. City of Fort Worth v. Corbin, 504 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tex. 1974).
183. TEX.PROP.CODEANN. 8 21.041 (West 1984).
184. Id; $ 21.018.
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owner and charge all value decreases to the state whenever a
pattern of predatory state conduct is shown t o exist. Faced with
such potent protections of private ownership rights, the state
would be foolish to risk value-depleting regulatory conduct.
This rule would not interfere with the normal delays or charge
governments with the value fluctuations which the First English Court expressly recognized as an incident of ownership. In
fact, such a rule would fit First English's holding that temporary takings and non-permanent interferences with private
ownership rights are cornpen~able.'~~
In situations A and C, a more moderate approach might
maintain the landowner's rights t o bear the loss or enjoy the
reward arising from value changes due to changes in general
economic circumstances during the condemnation process. However, once a pattern of predatory municipal conduct is established by the landowner, the state would bear the burden of
proof to make clear and convincing showings (1) as to how
much of any value increase or decrease was due solely to general economic conditions wholly unrelated to the public project
and permissible normal delays which were not part of a predatory pattern, and (2) that any delay in payment, whether past,
present, or future, was not part of a continuing pattern of predatory conduct by government. Absent such showings by the
state, the landowner would recover all value increases while
the state would suffer all value decreases. The shift in the
burden of proof would also deter government's predatory conduct.
In instances of predatory conduct, the critical period of
valuation fluctuations should be measured from the earliest
governmental step which is part of a pattern leading to the
deprivation or diminution of the landowner's rights t o the use
and enjoyment of the private property. For example, in Texas
case law, where the delay is excessive or the interference with
property rights is particularly egregious, the rule should protect the property owner.186

185. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U S . 304, 318-20 (1987).
186. Uehlinger, 387 S.W.2d at 432. It must be noted, however, that in Texas
the relevant statutes tend to encourage abuse by predatory governmentcondemnors
in more subtle ways, and this is not in keeping with the tenor of the opinions in
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900-01; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831; or First English, 482 U.S.
at 316-17.
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C. Potential Future Legal Changes Favoring the Owner
The privatist-oriented decision in Lucas makes it clear that
changes destroying the legal uses of a property after the creation of the owner's R.I.B.E. will not be considered in valuing
just compensation for the property's taking by r e g ~ l a t i o n . ' ~ ~
While the Lucas opinion did not address the other possibility-legal changes which might increase v a l u e a t a t e courts
have grappled with the question of how to consider potential
future changes in zoning or other value-impacting land regulations which might increase the value of lands involved in eminent domain takings. In other words, what if the R.I.B.E. of a
private landowner includes, at the moment before government
commences its predatory conduct, a reasonable expectation that
zoning will be changed to a more valuable classification? What
if the landowner has a reasonable expectation that variances or
permits for a more valuable land use will be issued in the future?
Courts in both Tennessee and Texas have considered potential future rezoning for business uses in computing awards
to residential property owners for tracts taken by city governments?
In a Texas appellate case, the City of Austin
charged as error that the factfinder had been allowed to consider the commercial value of the tract when its commercial use
would violate valid existing city zoning ordinances. Recognizing
that "[ilt is a matter of common knowledge that cities fiequently lift zoning ordinances or reclass& property in particular
zones when the business or wants of the community justifies
that type of action," the court refused to establish a rule barring evidence of such property use.lS9Rather, the court stated
that the trial judge should admit such evidence if satisfied
"that the wants and needs of the particular community may
result, within a reasonable time, in the lifting of restrictions."lgO The jury should consider the evidence related to
such probability and apply it in arriving a t the market value of
the property taken.lgl

187. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901.
188. State v. Cox, 840 S.W.2d 357, 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); City of Austin
v. Cannizzo, 267 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tex. 1954).
189. Cannizw, 267 S.W.2d at 815.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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This rule has been interpreted in basically two ways. First,
evidence of the probability of change in restrictions is inadmissible in the absence of testimony that the proscribed use would
be the highest and best use of the property taken.'" Second,
if the court is satisfied that there is no reasonable probability
that existing zoning restrictions will be changed within a reasonable time, it should exclude evidence of market value based
on the property's use for any purpose other than that to which
it is presently restricted. lg3
This issue presents the privatist-statist clash in a vivid
fashion. A statist-oriented lawmaker, stuck with Lucas, would
argue that since value-eroding land regulations which government may adopt subsequent to the date of R.I.B.E. determination are not allowed-at least if such regulations fit within
Lucas's evolving categorical formulation-then logical consistency should exclude any such value-enhancing changes as
well.
A privatist-oriented lawmaker would respond that logical
consistency is not the proper question. Given the policy origins
of the Fifth Amendment, the balance should always weigh most
heavily towards maximizing the R.I.B.E. formula for calculating just compensation of the deprived landowner, particularly
in predatory situations. Accordingly, reasonably foreseeable
zoning variances and other changes benefitting the private
property's value should be part of the R.I.B.E. calculus.

D. R.I.B.E. a n d Illegality of Present Uses
A closely related question deals with the existence of illegal
uses. For example, in United States v. 320.0 Acres, the government was attempting to disallow compensation for cabins
which they maintained were illegal.lg4 The Fifth Circuit ruled
that if the cabins were legal and unobjectionable, the owners
were entitled to full compensation for them, and when the
government is attempting to keep the values of existing structures from the factfinder on the basis of their illegality, the
illegality must be established as a threshold issue.lg5 "As a

192. Continental Dev. Corp. v. State, 337 S.W.2d 371, 373-74 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1960).
193. Henslee v. State, 375 S.W.2d 474, 478-79 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), error
refused n.r.e. (1964).
194. 605 F.2d 762, 821-22 (5th Cir. 1979).
195. Id.
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preliminary matter, it is the Government's burden to prove that
a n existing structure is unlawful and therefore should not, as a
matter of public policy, be compen~ated."'~~
Once that threshold has been achieved, the property owner
must prove that the structure was built legally with a valid
permit.19' However, even if the owner fails in that burden, he
can still introduce evidence that the relevant regulatory authority would otherwise allow the structure to remain:lg8
[Clompensation for an existing and otherwise valuable structure can be completely denied only if it was an illegal use at
the time it was built. If it is only by virtue of supervening
laws and regulations that the structure has become an illegal
use, the owner does not forfeit his constitutional right to be
justly compensated for his property.lg9

Note the parallel between the court's analysis on illegality
of structures and the essential elements of predatory governmental gamesmanship. Moreover, in the area of predatory
gamesmanship, the problem of illegal use is compounded. The
predatory regulations themselves may make the valuation of
just compensation more difficult since the market value of the
structure may have been altered by those laws. "But the difficulties involved in ascertaining 'just compensation' in these
circumstances do not warrant denying compensation altogether."2w It appears, under the Fifth Circuit's rule, that it would
be a n abuse of discretion for a trial judge to exclude consideration of the value of such a structure on the basis that its present, but not original, illegality would make consideration of the
now proscribed use speculative, remote, or irrelevant.
I n the case of predatory regulations, this may be another
instance where the burden of proof should shift to government.
Certainly, employing the presumption of constitutional correctness has no place where predatory governmental activities
have been involved. I t would not be a n undue burden on the
municipalities to show that the use was illegal at the time of
R.I.B.E. determination, and not as the result of predatory regulation. Moreover, Lucas strongly suggests that, unless the pre-

Id. at 821 (emphasis added).
Id. at 822.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
200. Id.
196.
197.
198.
199.
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surnption of correctness is put aside, hollow statutory language
can paper over the fundamental questions, and statist appetites will remain ~nchecked.~"
Diminishing the compensable value of property taken for
public projects is at the heart of predatory municipal regulations, and declaring an existing use unlawful is merely a subset
of such predatory practices. An individual's R.I.B.E. for property being condemned could be valued a t any time between the
property's initial acquisition by the landowner and the taking
of the property by the state through occupation or deed. Predatory conduct can be discouraged by rules protecting the property owner's right to just compensation. Otherwise, predatory
conduct and gamesmanship will be encouraged by rules that
permit regulatory tactics to diminish value and reduce compensation.
E. Value Determinations, the Evolving Public Project and
Predatory Municipal Conduct
Public projects naturally require time to be planned, to
evolve and to take shape. Therefore, courts and parties have
extraordinary dmculty in determining compensability of value
changes which occur during the course of condemnation, particularly those caused by the project. In federal jurisdictions,
recovery is limited to the amount of value which has accmed to
the property as of the earliest time that the property can be
said to lie "probably within the scope of the project."202I t is
a t this point in time that a taking is considered to have occ~rred.~O~
This is not to say that "mere fluctuations in value during
the course of governmental decision making" are compensable
takings by the constitutional standard. In First English, the
Court observed that "depreciation in value of the property by
reason of preliminary activity is not chargeable to the government.'Similarly, in United States v. 2,175.86 Acres, the Fifth
Circuit held that where government has proceeded by straight
condemnation, "[a] reduction or increase in the value of proper201. Lucas, 112 s. Ct. at 2900.
202. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 377 (1943).
203. See id.
204. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 320 (1987).
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ty . . . by reason of legislation for or the beginning or completion of a project . . . are incidents of ownership. [Such increases
and decreases] cannot be considered as a 'taking' in the constitutional sense."205The court fured the time of "taking" as the
time of payment of the award, when government has not substantially interfered with landowners' rights in their property
prior to
That ruling was affirmed in 1984 when the Supreme Court
held that a taking takes place on the date of deposit of the
award, provided that the landowner failed to show any constitutionally significant impairment of its interests that amounted
to a n earlier taking, since that deposit constituted acquiescence
by the condemnor.207In First English, the Court in dicta commented that even though, as a matter of law, a n illegitimate
taking might not occur until the government refuses to pay,
interference that rises to the level of a taking might begin
much earlier, and compensation could be measured from that
earlier time.208Thus, it appears to be critical to differentiate
between acceptable preliminary activity and unacceptable substantial interference or constitutionally significant impairment
of the landowner's interest.
In 1985, the Fifth Circuit ruled that where the condemnor
had not deposited security with the court (thereby defining the
scope of the project and constructively taking the property), the
relevant date of taking for purposes of valuing the compensation was the date of trial.209However, since the facts indicated that the condemning authority (here a telephone utility
company) had signXcantly impaired landowner Hazel Gully's
property rights prior to the time of trial, the court held that
she should be compensated for that impairment as well. The
company's delays in pursuing the condemnation action were
held to be compensable. In a telling statement, the Gully court
wrote that "[tlime is money, and the jury believed that the time
Gully spent waiting for Bell to do something cost her
$92,000."~~~

205. United States v. 2,175.86 Acres, 696 F.2d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 1983), a r d ,
467 U.S. 1 (1984) (quoting Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939)).
206. Id. at 356.
207. Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U S . 1, 14-15 (1984).
208. First English, 482 US. at 320.
209. Gully v.. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 774 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (5th Cir.
1985).
210. Id. at 1292.

8271

PREDATORY GOVERNMENTAL ZONING

867

The Fifth Circuit has noted that rules and standards to be
applied in measuring just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment are not absolute and invariable.211If the scope of
the project ("SOP") is enlarged, additional property need not be
shown to have been specified as involved in the project at the
outset for the scope of the project to apply, so long as the need
for additional property became known during the course of
planning or original construction.212Here again, a strong
premise exists to look at the date of the earliest municipal
conduct where predatory actions are involved. Making the
determination of timing even more equity-oriented, the court
held that the crucial inquiry is whether serious anticipation of
the condemnation diminished any potential purchaser's reasonable expectations as to its uses.213This part of the holding is,
at its core, the very essence of the Supreme Court's concept of
R.I.B.E.
The trial judge has primary responsibility to determine
these SOP issues.214The Fifth Circuit stated that the SOP
rule operates like a presumption, disregarding both positive or
negative effects on compensation that are attributable t o the
project itself. "The key to a just determination of the SOP issue
is to set the date as of which the rule is triggered with due
regard for the compensation consequences, so that the presumption does not unfairly favor either the Government or the
landowner."215
In the context of most predatory zoning by state and local
governments, government's conduct is intended t o depress the
targeted property's value. While value-enhancement issues,
such as possible zoning changes which would allow more profitable use of the property, are subject to the limitations noted
earlier, state-caused diminutions properly should be ignored in
determining compensation. For instance, the Texas Supreme
Court has conditioned the determination of compensation for
property taken by eminent domain by stating that "fair market
value must, by definition, be computed as if there were no proThis language focuses
ceedings to eliminate that market.77216
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
added).

United States v. 320.0 Acres, 605 F.2d 762, 781 (5th Cir. 1979).

Id. at 793.
Id. at 807.
Id.
Id. at 806.
City of Fort Worth v. Corbin, 504 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tex. 1974) (emphasis
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upon the direct condemnation proceedings themselves, but its
essence is t o neutralize the negative effect on market value
created by government's activities. It follows that, in the area
of predatory takings, the value-impacting conduct by the government should be neutralized in property value calculations in
the same way that straightforward proceedings to condemn are
neutralized in a direct taking for purposes of determining value. The "just compensation" mandated by the Constitution
should not be diminished because government has chosen rentseeking conduct-predatory gamesmanshiprather than a
straightforward taking.217

F. Future Value
Three fbture-value doctrines overlap in shaping a property
owner's R.I.B.E. a n d must be considered together.
1. "Remote or speculative" versus R.I.B.E.
The rules for exclusion of "remote or speculative" evidence
of land value should not be used to foreclose R.I.B.E. proof in
predatory zoning cases. Normally, the proper way for the court
to limit the effect of evidence which should not influence its
determination of market value is by excluding it.218Attempting to instruct the jury as to which elements it is to consider or
what weight thoseelements should be given is not proper for
the court.219
I f . . . a proffered potential use is not reasonably practicable
or probable, so that no reasonably minded trier of fact faithk l l y applying the law could find that it represents an element of fair market value, then of course the landowner is not
entitled to have evidence concerning that use considered by
the trier of fact.220

Valuation of just compensation may depend on the timing of
the valuation itself. "Remote, speculative, and conjectural" uses
of the property certainly might include those which are contrary
to existing governmental zoning or restriction. These uses may
be prospective or existing. Existing uses may predate the
217. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U S . 304, 320 (1987).
218. State v. Carpenter, 89 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
219. DuPuy v. City of Waco, 396 S.W.2d 103, 111 (Tex. 1965).
220. United States v. 320.0 Acres, 605 F.2d 762, 818 (5th Cir. 1979).
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restrictions which seek t o limit or eliminate the pre-existing
uses. The zoning restrictions themselves are subject to a wide
range of possible revisions or elimination.221They may change
the legality of a use during the eminent domain proceedings.222
If the timing of the valuation is based on the time of "taking,"
and if the existing use of the property at that time is
presumptively legal, based on an existing permit allowing that
use, then that use should be one of the factors for determining
the compensable value of the property being taken.22sMore
importantly, if any restrictions upon the existing use are found
to be part of the municipality's pattern of predatory regulation,
such restrictions logically should be ignored in formulating the
value of the taking. In such an analysis, it is not "remote or
speculative" to allow the fair market value for compensation
purposes to reflect an R.I.B.E. which, but for government's
predatory behavior, would truly be a reasonable expectation.
As to reasonable fbture uses that would be embraced within
R.I.B.E., most of the case law regarding the admissibility of
evidence pertaining to values of prohibited uses of the property
relates to prospective uses. The landowner must say that the
property should not be valued based on its existing usage, but
rather, should be based on a more valuable prospective use
which is currently restricted or prohibitedeZaThus, the timing
of the government's predatory regulation is essential to questions
of both current and potential future market value.
2. Highest and best use and R.I.B.E.

Not all reasonable expectations of value are tied t o current
land use, and a future expectation could exist only to be
frustrated by subsequent predatory conduct of government. We
have noted that Lucas requires that local property and tort laws,
as they exist on the date of acquisition by the private landowner,
form the basis for determining R.I.B.E.2* However, it can be
maintained that the earliest date of government's predatory
activity should be the R.1.B.E.-determining date in a predatory
regulatory taking. However, both views run afoul of two classical

221. City of Austin y. C a ~ i z z o ,267 S.W.2d 808, 815 (Tex. 1954).
222. Id.
223. 320.0 Acres, 605 F.2d at 821.
224. See State v. Cox, 840 S.W.2d 357, 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); NICHOLS,
supm note 101, $8 12.02[1], 12B.12.
225. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901.
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eminent domain concepts that look to future uses in exploring
the damages suffered by the private owner: (1) the concept of
"highest and best use," and (2) the corollary concept that
allocates the benefit of probable future regulatory changes to the
property owner.
In valuing the compensation to be paid owners for property
taken from them by the government for public use, "[tlhe
objective of the judicial process under the Constitution and
statutes is to make the landowner whole and to award him only
what he could have obtained for his land in a free market."226
This market value may be shown by the property's most
profitable use.227 Accordingly, appropriate compensation is
determined by the market value of the property, considering its
highest and best use.'" The rules of evidence are necessarily
liberal regarding such proof of market value.229 To be
consistent with the value-laden safeguards erected in state and
federal constitutions to protect citizens from the effects of a n
abusive exercise of the power of eminent domain by government,
requirements for compensation should be liberally ~ o n s t r u e d . ' ~ ~
Similarly, compliance by government with the established
procedural requirements of condemnation should be strictly
demanded.231
Traditionally, the factfinder is entitled to consider every
factor determining what could have been obtained for the
property in a transaction between the hypothetically prudent,
willing, and able buyer and sellerY2 All matters that tend to
increase or diminish the present market value are properly
admitted.25s All factors which would be given weight in
negotiations between a buyer and seller are to be ons side red.'^
Thus, the measure of just compensation for market value is not

226. City of Fort Worth v. Corbin, 504 S.W.2d 828, 831 (Tex. 1974).
227. McCandless v. United States, 298 U.S. 342, 345 (1936).
228. McAshan v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 739 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987).
229. Thompson v. State, 319 S.W.2d 368, 370 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
230. City of Houston v. Derby, 215 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Tex. Civ. App.), error
refused (1948).
231. City of Fort Worth v. Dietert, 271 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
232. City of Pearland v. Alexander, 483 S.W.2d 244, 246-47 (Tex. 1972); see State
v. Cox, 840 S.W.2d 357, 360-62 (Tenn. 1991).
233. Sample v. T e ~ e s s e eGas Transmission Co., 251 S.W.2d 221, 223-24 (Tex.
1952).
234. State v. Knapp, 740 S.W.2d 809, 815 (Tex. Ct. App.), judgment set aside,
742 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. 1987).
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limited to the value of the property's present use, but includes
any additional value added by realistic prospects for developing
it to a higher and more suitable purpose.235 This concept,
providing that market value equals the value of the investors'
reasonable marketplace expectations as to the development
potential of the property rights being taken, is materially similar
to the R.I.B.E. approach pointed to by the Lucas Court to better
identlfy property values which must be compensated if taken by
government's regulatory actions.236

3. Future value: Unique suitability and R.I.B.E.
One reasonable expectation of an owner is tied to prospective
business uses of a parcel of land. Special values attributable to
the property's unique suitability for the conduct of a particular
future business can be introduced as evidence establishing its
market value.237Examples of such special values might include
proximity to competing businesses, availability of zoning
variances, and differences in applicable restrictive covenant^.^^
In determining future value, unique suitability is an important
element of market value, and location has been described as the
keystone and soul of the economics of market value of real
property.23gIn this regard, there exists a presumption in favor
of the existing use of land.240Again, most states value the
damages arising out of loss of unique suitability based on the
willing buyer-seller equation.241
The factors involved in "future-looking" value determinations
are not unlimited, even if they are aspects of a willing buyerseller formulation. For instance, the Texas Supreme Court has
observed that "purely speculative uses" which are wholly
unavailable to the property's buyer or seller would not be factors
in their decision to buy or sell and, thus, should be excluded from
consideration of market value.242 Most importantly, in their

235. United States v. 320.0 Acres, 605 F.2d 762, 781 (5th Cir. 1979).
236. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901 (1992).
237. See State v. Cox, 840 S.W.2d 357, 361 ( T ~ M .Ct. App. 1991); Reeves v. City
of Dallas, 195 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
238. City of Austin v. Casiraghi, 656 S.W.2d 576, 581 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
239. Madison S. Rayburn, Legal Rights and Legal Fictions in Condemnation, 10
HOUS.L. REV. 251, 259 (1972).
240. McAshan v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 739 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987).
241. City of Austin v. C a ~ i z z o 267
,
S.W.2d 808, 814 (Tex. 1954).
242. Id.
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opinion in City of Austin u. Cannizzo, the Texas court used
language bearing upon the future market value for use in the
jury instruction:
You are instructed that the term "market value" is the price
which the property would bring when it is offered for sale by
one who desires, but is not obliged to sell, and is bought by one
who is under no necessity of buying it, taking into
consideration all of the uses to which it is reasonably adaptable
and for which it either is or in all reasonable probability will
become available within the reasonable

The critical determination is whether unique suitability for
a particular fbture business site as a potential future use is
contemplated in the proffered evidence and reflected in the value
placed on the property by reasonable market expectations. Lucas
poses the following question: Would the marketplace possess
certain R.I.B.E. characteristics as to future uses such as a unique
suitability for a particular business that would impact the
current value? If not, then "[elvidence should be excluded [when
it relates] to remote, speculative, and conjectural uses, as well as
injuries, which are not reflected in the present market value of
the property."244
The courts play a particularly difficult role in determining
whether fbture value is applicable. It is the role of the court to
determine what evidence is to be presented to the finder of fact
in its determination of market value.245The trial judge is
vested with considerable discretion in determining the
admissibility of evidence as to market value, and the reviewing
court is "not authorized to substitute [its] rulings for [the trial
court's] exclusion of evidence unless it appears that [it] has
abused [its] discretion."246

G. State Deterrence and R.I.B.E. Calculations
Personal freedoms are protected from predatory state
conduct through a variety of mechanisms, most of which center
around denying the state any significant rewards of conduct
inimical to the Bill of Rights. By giving the state a disincentive
t o engage in certain conduct, that conduct, it is hoped, will be
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at 815.
State v. Carpenter, 89 S.W.2d 194, 200 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
DuPuy v. City of Waco, 396 S.W.2d 103, 111 (Tex. 1965).
Jacobs v. State, 384 S.W.2d 438, 440 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).

8271

PREDATORY GOVERNMENTAL ZONING

873

discouraged. For instance, the exclusionary rule hangs like the
proverbial Sword of Damocles over constitutionally impermissible
federal actions involving coerced confessions or wrongNly seized
evidence.247In 1961 this rule was applied to actions by the
separate states securing individual liberties against state
encroachment.248Creating disincentives for predatory state
conduct would be equally persuasive in Takings Clause
jurisprudence.
A basic premise of the drafters of the Constitution, revisited
in the Lucas opinion, is that constitutional safeguards of
individual property rights, as well as personal freedoms such as
speechug and religion:50 deserve the highest dignity and
protection.251Under Lucas it would appear constitutionally
impermissible for the state to benefit from its predatory conduct
and escape from paying for value added by the condemnation
project. Moreover, it seems offensive to the Takings Clause to
reward the state with the fiscal advantage of an award based on
the diminished marketability of the project after the
condemnation has become a de facto certainty. The R.I.B.E. of
property owners are certainly affected by the state's action, and
just compensation is required. In order t o provide protections of
equal dignity between property rights under the Fifth
Amendment and those guaranteed for other constitutional rights
and &eedoms, the most appropriate moment in time to determine
value is whatever moment would do the most to discourage
predatory state conduct.

The R.I.B.E. calculus is perhaps the ultimate issue in most
Takings Clause contests in the wake of five years of significant
Supreme Court revision. This calculus requires unique
consideration of each of the clusters of Takings Clause doctrines.
In the instance of predatory municipal zoning practices, the
approach requires that R.I.B.E. determinations address (i) the
timing of the regulatory "taking" as distinct from the timing of
the owner's capital investment; (ii) the body of law that must be
brought to bear upon the R.I.B.E. formulation; (iii) the
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US. 643 (1961).
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2904.
Id. at 2907.
Id. at 2901.
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percentages of value of the fee simple of the entire tract as
contrasted t o that of the portions of the tract or the single
strands of rights within the entire fee simple bundle; and (iv) the
traditional concept of "highest and best use," which accounts for
future value, and how the highest and best use should be
ascertained in light of the R.I.B.E. timing issues.
The Supreme Court has come a great distance in just a few
years t o bring greater order out of Takings Clause chaos. It now
remains for government and private counsel to persuade courts
t o resolve the open R.I.B.E. issues of timing and the applicable
body of law.
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Michigan has generated a number of interesting lawsuits involving
predatory municipal and regulation practices. Chief among them is
Amen v. City of Dearborn, 718 F.2d 789 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1101 (1984), where the city drove private code enforcement in
order to require private owners to install unnecessary equipment and
encouraged stripping of vacant neighborhood homes, all in an effort to
obtain the properties a t artificially low market values. See also
Madison Realty Co. v. City of Detroit, 315 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Mich.
1970);Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966), d#,
405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968);Board of Educ. v. Clarke, 280 N.W.2d 574
(Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
California has been a particularly fertile source of litigation
involving temporary regulatory takings of a predatory nature. Many
landowners have been successhl in their lawsuits against
municipalities. See, eg., Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 703
F.2d 1141 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 847 (1983); Richmond Elks
Hall Ass'n v. Richmond Redevelopment Agency, 561 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir.
1977); City of Torrance v. Superior Court, 545 P.2d 1313 (Cal. 1976);
Klopping v. City of Whittier, 500 P.2d 1345 (Cal. 1972); City of Los
Angeles v. Tilem, 191 Cal. Rptr. 229 (Ct. App. 1983); Taper v. City of
Long Beach, 181 Cal. Rptr. 169 (Ct. App. 1982); People ex rel. Dep't of
Pub. Works v. Peninsula Enters., Inc., 153 Cal. Rptr. 895 (Ct. App.
1979).
See also Urbanizadora Versalles, Inc. v. Rivera Rios, 701 F.2d 993
(1st Cir. 1983) (property owner brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action
where government "fioze" development of land without actually
condemning it so as to reduce its market value and thereby reduce
compensation required upon eventual taking); Board of Comm'rs v.
Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 108 So. 2d 74, 86 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App.
1958) ('The conclusions. . . are further supported by the many
decisions which condemn the arbitrary adoption of a zoning ordinance
for the sole purpose of depressing land values preliminary to eminent
domain proceedings."); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products,
98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723 (1985).
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